Michigan Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 4

1958

Oil and Gas - Leases - Validity When Executed by Life Tenant and
Remaindermen at Different Times
Albert A. Haller
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Albert A. Haller, Oil and Gas - Leases - Validity When Executed by Life Tenant and Remaindermen at
Different Times, 56 MICH. L. REV. 654 (1958).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/14

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

654

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

OIL AND GAS-LEASES-VALIDITY WHEN EXECUTED BY LIFE TENANT AND
R.EMAINDERMEN AT DIFFERENT TIMES-In 1952 plaintiffs acquired an oil
and gas lease from the life tenant which they assigned two years later,
reserving an overriding 1/16 royalty interest. Subject to plaintiffs' royalty
rights this lease was eventually acquired by the defendant. In 1954, the
remaindermen executed an oil and gas lease to defendant's wife who
assigned a 7/8 working interest to eight persons, and reserved a 1/8 working
interest which she later assigned to defendant, subject to a 1/16 overriding
royalty interest in herself. Action was brought by plaintiffs against defendant, his wife and her eight assignees for a declaration of rights of the
parties in oil being produced on land covered by the leases. The trial
court concluded ·that title to the leases had merged and vested a valid
oil and gas lease in the defendants who were working the property.
On appeal, held, reversed. The life tenant's lease to plaintiffs was invalid when executed and was not validated by subsequent events. There
was no merger of titles which could validate the lease because the entire
interests were never joined in one person or a separate entity. Rowe v.
Bird, (Ky. 1957) 304 S.W. (2d) 775.
This decision applies the apparently uniform rule that neither a life
tenant nor remainderman, acting alone, can convey a present right to
take oil and gas.1 This rule has developed through application of the
common law doctrine of waste. Minerals while in the ground constitute
part of the realty and cannot be extracted by a life tenant. Since the life
tenant cannot himself develop the land for oil and gas, he cannot create
a greater right in others by lease~ Similarly the remainderman has no
right to immediate possession of the land and thus no power to violate
the life tenant's right to possession by leasing present interests to others.
The court in the principal case acknowledges the invalidity of leases
separately executed by the life tenants and remaindermen but appears
to recognize that they can be validated by subsequent events. If it is admitted, however, that an ultimate merger of title will cure pre-existing
defects, the question arises why the court concludes that a partial merger
would not have the same effect. The trend of authority indicates a general
policy to free petroleum-bearing land for development absent persuasive
reasons to the contrary.2 It is arguable that since one defendant received
all of the life tenant's interest subject to a 1/8 royalty and 1/8 of the
defendant's wife's remainder interest, there could be a partial merger.3

1 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS §§223, 224 (1938).
2 Warren, "Policy Limitations on Oil and Gas

Leasing," 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 474 at 474,
506 (1956).
3 See Bosley v. Burk, 154 Md. 27, 139 A. 543 (1927), where a purchaser of the life
estate in the whole property, and later an undivided ¼ interest in remainder, through
merger, became owner of an undivided ¼ in fee simple. See also Mdntosh v. Ropp, 233
Pa. 497, 82 A. 949 (1912), where a lease by a life tenant was later ratified by one of two
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Under this view, it might be argued that the defendant, having a valid lease
on an undivided 1/8 interest in the fee, would have a right to extract
minerals from the property despite the outstanding remainder interests.4
It is therefore necessary to determine if the court, by denying relief, acted
in conformity with the trend toward free development. The problem is to
maximize protection of individual property interests of the life tenant
and remainderman while promoting petroleum utilization. When a life
tenant and remainderman execute a lease jointly,5 ratify the other's independent lease,6 or accept the benefits created by the other's independently executed lease,7 each has consented to an invasion of his property
rights. 8 This same reasoning would seem to apply where the rights of
both parties subsequently come to rest in one person or entity.9 But in
the present case, allowing partial merger would enable the defendant to
exploit the property, having only to account to the outstanding 7/8 remainder interests. At the same time, the lessees of the outstanding 7/8 remainder interest could not work the land, for to do so would violate the
defendant's interest in the life estate. It would seem, therefore, that the
basic objection to allowing a life tenant to give an oil and gas lease still
obtains, and the outstanding remainder interests would not be adequately
protected by .µlowing the defendant to proceed as he wished in this case.

remaindermen. The court concluded the non-ratifying remainderman's rights are to
be worked out on the basis of a lease by a co-tenant without the consent of the other
co-tenant.
4 A possible analogy may be found in the view of a majority of the courts that a
co-tenant has a right to develop the land despite objection of the other co-tenants,
having to account to his co-tenants for their share of the total production minus the costs
of production. Williams, "The Effect of Concurrent Interests on Oil and Gas Transactions," 34 TIDC. L. REv. 519 at 520 (1956); KULP, On. AND GAS RIGHTS §10.19 (1954).
Moreover, Kentucky seems to adopt a more liberal rule ·than the majority. The nondeveloping co-tenant may recover only a reasonable royalty from the developing co-tenant
or his lessee on any oil or gas produced before the filing of his suit. The non-developing
co-tenant's recovery is the same as under the majority rule for any oil produced after
filing of the suit against the developing co-tenant or his lessee. Gillispie v. Blanton, 214
Ky. 49, 282 S.W. 1061 (1926); New Domain Oil &: Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 221
s:w. 245 (1920).
5 Meredith v. Meredith, 193 Ky. 192, 235 S.W. 757 (1921), cited in the principal case
at 778; 2 THORNTON, On. AND GAS §430 (1932; Supp. 1956); 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS
§224 (1938).
6 Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 141 ,Kan. 147, 40 P. (2d) 463 (1935). Cf. Yost v. Ratliff,
(Ky. 1951) 246 S.W. (2d) 447.
7 2 SUMMERS, On. AND GAS §223 (1938).
SConsent is a bar to an action of trespass brought by a life tenant. PROSSER, TORTS
§18 (1955). Compare with Williams, "The Effect of Various Conditions of Ownership
on Oil and Gas Transactions," 5 UTAH L. REv. I at 3 (1956), that the lease merely effects
a transfer to the lessee of the veto power of the grantor on development by the other.
9 It seems that whether this is viewed as consent .by the lessor, or as an estoppel of
the lessor, it would not alter the result. See dictum at p. 778 of principal case. In both
instances the party should be entitled to develop for oil and gas when he obtains both
the life tenant's and remainderman's respective interests.
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Moreover, allowance of a partial merger would increase the already difficult problems of an accounting.10 The court, in addition to determining the rights of holders of present, future, and royalty interests, would
have to value the interests of those lessees in whom there was no partial
merger, as opposed to the interests of the lessee in whom there was a valid
partial merger. In the light of these difficulties, insistence by this court on
merger in one person or single entity, though perhaps an impediment to
development of resources, seems justifiable as a means of protecting the
property rights of both life tenant and remaindermen. If it is felt the
policy of petroleum development is more important than protection of
particular property interests, the solution would seem ultimately to rest
with the legislature and not the courts.11
Albert A. Haller

10 When a life tenant and the owner of the future interest join in a lease and fail
to make an agreement on the method of dividing lease proceeds, the apportionment
of these proceeds has been the subject of considerable litigation. See generally Williams,
"The Effect of Various Conditions of Ownership on Oil and Gas Transactions," 5 UTAH
L. REv. 1 at 4-5 (1956); KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS §10.18 (1954).
11 Some legislative progress ,has already •been made in this direction in some states
by allowing land subject to contingent future interests to be leased, through court proceedings, by life tenants. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§353.300 to 353.380; Okla. Stat.
(1941) tit. 60, §§71 to 73.

